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Defendant/Appellant.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
•i. Has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
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ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
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lid, . - :h( committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'"

State v. Holgate, 2000

(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Because this issue was not preserved below, it is reviewed
for plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111, 10 P.3d 346. Alternatively, this
issue should be reviewed to determine whether defense counsel's failure to move for a
directed verdict constituted ineffective assistance of counsel? When a claim of
ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of
law. State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v.
Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994)).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of all relevant statutory provisions is set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Dean Alan Shephard appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of
the Third Judicial District Court after being convicted of possession or operation of a
clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony, possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, and possession of
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Dean Alan Shephard was charged by information filed in Third District Court on
December 13, 200 L, with: Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment, a first

degree felony; Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a first
degree felony; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and False
Identity to a Peace Officer, a class C misdemeanor (R. 1, 5-8, 9-12). The information
also indicated that the clandestine laboratory charge was subject to enhanced penalty
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-5(l)(d), (e) and/or (f) (R. 5).
On January 10, 2002, Shephard waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the
matter was bound over for trial (R. 22-23).
On April 11, 2002, Shephard filed a motion to suppress evidence on grounds that
it was obtained pursuant to a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 4246). A suppression hearing was held on July 29, 2002, before Judge Steven Roth,
where the State alleged that because of a protective order against Shephard in
relationship to Micalyn Yocham, Shephard lacked standing to challenge the seizure of
any evidence pursuant to State v. Webb (R. 310: 4-5, 11). The State presented a copy
of the protective order at the hearing (R. 181-85) but no return of service. The State
also argued that there was a criminal "no contact" order in place from October 24,
2001, in case number 011910084 (R. 168, 310: 7-8). The trial court agreed with the
State and ruled that Shephard lacked standing (R. 310: 11-12). However, Judge
Roth's ruling was conditioned upon the court subsequently receiving a certified copy of
the return of service of the protective order (R. 310: 9-10, 12).

On September 6, 2002, written findings of fact and conclusions of law denying
the motion to suppress were filed and signed by Judge Sheila McCleve on September
30, 2002 (R. 99-100, 111). Specifically the trial court found: One, that a protective
order was entered on October 22, 2001, which ordered that Shephard be removed and
excluded from the residence at 636 East Sego Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 99).
Two, that on November 7, 2001, the protective order was served on Shephard as
shown by the Return of Service (R. 99). Three, that evidence in this case was seized
from the residence at 636 East Sego Avenue where Shephard was present (R. 100).
And four, that the protective order was still in effect at the time the evidence was seized
on December 4, 2001 (R. 100). The trial court concluded as follows: One, Shephard
had no legal right to be present on the property from which the evidence was seized by
court order. Two, Shephard had no privacy interests in the residence where the
evidence was seized. Three, Shephard accordingly has no standing to contest the
search of the residence (R. 100).
A copy of the protective order and return of service was attached to the findings
(R. 105-10). However, the certified copy of the protective order indicates that
Shephard was not present at the October 22, 2001, hearing where the protective order
was placed in effect (R. 105). In addition, the certified copy of the return of service
only indicates that the protective order was served by leaving a copy of the order with
Deputy R. Ramos at 3415 South 900 West (R. 110).

On August 14, 2002, Shephard filed a motion to exclude fingerprint testimony
unless the State could prove its inherent reliability at a pre-trial hearing pursuant to
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 (Utah 1989) (R. 64-65, 73-79). On August 15,
2002, the State filed a notice of expert witness which named Karen Kido, a certified
latent fingerprint examiner with the Salt Lake Police Department crime lab (R. 82).
On August 23, 2002, Ralph Dellapiana and the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on grounds of a conflict of interest
(R. 91). The motion was granted and Manny Garcia and Kevin Kurumada were
appointed to represent Shephard at trial (R. 95). On September 6, 2002, Manny Garcia
entered his appearance as counsel for Shephard (R. 97).
On September 16, 2002, the trial court signed an order requiring the jail to
monitor all of Shephard's correspondence to insure compliance with the no contact
order between Shephard and the co-defendants, Micalyn Yocham and Todd Turner (R.
103).
On September 30, 2002, Judge McCleve orally denied Shephard's motion to
exclude fingerprint testimony on reliability grounds (R. 313: 8). At this hearing,
defense counsel (Garcia) raised the issue of whether the protective order had personally
been served on Shephard when it was left with a jailer but then not given to Shephard
(R. 313: 2-3). Judge McCleve indicated that Judge Roth had already heard and decided
the motion to suppress'(R. 313: 3-4). Garcia then indicated his belief-based upon
discussions with previous defense counsel-t hat the matter had not yet been "resolved"

because there was still a question whether the State had offered proof that Shephard had
been personally served with a copy of the protective order (R. 313: 4). Judge McCleve
then stated that because factual findings and legal conclusions were ordered that "Judge
Ro[th] thought [the issue] was resolved" (R. 4). Garcia then indicates that he is simply
reserving the issue for appeal (R. 310: 4). However, then Garcia seems to retreat
from this issue by indicating that although Shephard never received the protective
order, "we're not going to pursue this motion to suppress" (R. 310: 5).
On October 9, 2002, Garcia filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on grounds
that "Defendant has stated to counsel that he has no faith in counsel's ability to
adequately represent him, which has created an unreconcilable conflict" (R. 116). On
October 11, 2002, Judge McCleve, after a hearing, signed an order granting the
withdrawal (R. 118, 314). Fred Metos was subsequently appointed as counsel for
Shephard (R. 130).
On January 14-15, 2003, a jury trial was held with Judge McCleve presiding (R.
195-97, 317, 318). After deliberation the jury convicted Shephard on counts I-III
(clandestine lab with three enhancements, possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute in a drug-free zone, and possession of drug paraphernalia) (R. 251-53).
The jury acquitted Shephard of providing a false identity to a peace officer (R. 254).
On March 3, 2003, Shephard was sentenced to consecutive 5-life terms in the
Utah State Prison and ordered to pay $5,190.46 in restitution (R. 276-77).

On March 17, 2003, Shephard filed a notice of appeal in Third District Court
(R. 281). On April 25, 2003, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the matter to this
Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (R. 288).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A. Testimony of Officer Mark R. Cryder
Mark Cryder, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department, was
dispatched on report from a neighbor to investigate a purported burglary in progress at
636 East Sego Avenue on December 3, 2001, at approximately 6:30 p.m. (R. 317: 6263, 64, 69). Other officers also contemporaneously responded to the scene, including
Officer Spangenberg (R. 317: 63). In addition, after Cryder's arrival at the scene,
Sergeant Findlay was also called to the house (R. 317: 64).
Spangenberg was the first officer to the scene and he discovered an individual
(Turner) coming out of the garage (R. 317: 64, 65, 69). Spangenberg detained and
questioned this individual (R. 317: 64).
Spangenberg and Officer West, who arrived with Cryder, conducted a protective
sweep of the garage to make sure that no one else was in the small, one-car garage (R.
317: 65, 71). The officers subsequently informed Cryder of items they had found in
the garage (R. 317: 65).
Turner was placed under arrest (R. 317: 72). Cryder and Findlay subsequently
entered the home adjacent to the garage due to "safety reasons" and to "make sure

there was no other maybe victims or possible suspects that might be inside the home"
(R. 317: 66). Cryder and Findlay knocked on a side door a couple of times before
Shephard opened the door (R. 317: 66). Findlay was given a name by Shephard and
was told that he did not own the home (R. 317: 66). Shephard was then taken out of
the doorway and was "handed off to Spangenberg, who continued to speak with
Shepard (R. 317: 66-67). Spangenberg subsequently learned Shephard's real name and
was told that Shephard had been "inside the living room sleeping on the couch" (R.
317: 67).
Cryder and Findlay entered the home and found no other individuals present (R.
317: 67). During this "protective sweep" of the house, Cryder observed a scale on a
table in a corner of the living room; and on top of the scale was a crystalline-type
substance that was consistent with methamphetamine (R. 317: 68, 74). In addition,
Cryder found some plastic baggies and glassware and other paraphernalia throughout
the house (R. 317: 68,76).

B. Testimony of Officer Joseph Sturzenegger, III
Joseph Sturzenegger, a narcotics detective with the Salt Lake City Police
Department, was notified that patrol officers had found a possible methamphetamine lab
at the above-referenced address on December 3, 2001 (R. 317: 78-79). Sturzenegger
and the rest of his unit responded to the scene (R. 317: 79). At the time Sturzenegger

arrived, Turner and Shephard were in custody and the side door to the garage was open
(R. 317: 92).
Sturzenegger spoke with "a couple of people that were detained" and then
"looked inside the garage" (R. 317: 79). Inside the garage, Sturzenegger found items
consistent with the clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 317: 79). It
appeared to Sturzenegger that the lab was "up and running in some sort of process" in
the southwest corner (R. 317: 80, 93, 94). Although Sturzenegger could not smell any
odor associated with chemicals, Haz-mat and the fire department were contacted to
come and test the air (R. 317: 80, 93). The other officers then remained at the scene
while Sturzenegger obtained a search warrant (R. 317: 80).
Sturzenegger returned to the scene after obtaining the warrant (R. 317: 80).
Sturzenegger then searched the inside of the house and found "lots of paraphernalia,
some methamphetamine, some residency items, some photographs, some lab hardware,
some lab chemicals" and a controlled substance on top of a digital scale on a table (R.
317: 81-82). Sturzenegger testified that such scales are commonly used in drug
distribution (R. 317: 98-99). Sturzenegger also found two plastic, zip-lock baggies next
to the scale (R. 317: 83, 95). A methamphetamine recipe was also located on the table
along with some glassware/dishes containing residue that field tested positive for
methamphetamine (R. 317: 87, 88; Defense Exhibit #1). A large, 1,000 milliliter glass
flask tube was found in the kitchen cupboard (R. 317: 88). Sturzenegger testified that
such a flat-bottom flask is often found in a lot of meth labs because "they stand up to

heat" (R. 317: 89). Other chemicals that are associated with the production of
methamphetamine-in eluding a BernzOmatic gas canister and a can of acetone-were
also found underneath the kitchen sink (R. 317: 90). In addition, several pipes were
found in the house (R. 317: 98).
These items were "processed", i.e., photographed, tested for latent fingerprints
(R. 317: 84). The substance on the scale was tested by the State Crime Lab and was
deemed to be 3.4 grams (an eighth of an ounce) of methamphetamine (R. 317: 85, 86,
110; State's Exhibit #4). Sturzenegger testified that this amount is more than an
individual would typically use in a day unless it was used with friends (R. 317: 109,
11041).
Sturzenegger testified that the amount of methamphetamine coupled with the
scale and the baggies is "indicative of drug distribution" (R. 317: 86-87). Sturzenegger
also indicated that meth labs are typically not run in the open but behind closed doors;
and that "most good cooks leave their cook unattended while it is cooking" (R. 317:
104-05). This "separates them from the lab" which "keeps them from blowing
themselves up" and "keeps them from discovery by law enforcement" (R. 317: 105).
C. Testimony of Officer Brad Davis
Brad Davis, who is assigned to the narcotics unit of the Salt Lake City Police
department, took a laser reading or measurement between 636 East Sego Avenue to
n

rolley Square (R. 317: 112). A laser is used to measure speed or distance (R. 317:

113). Davis testified that the distance between the home and the Trolley Square mall
was 554.4 feet (R. 317: 113-14).

D. Testimony of Bonnie Jill Stewart
Bonnie Jill Stewart is a crime lab technician with the Salt Lake City Police
Department (R. 317: 114-15). Stewart responded to the Sego Avenue residence to
photograph the scene and to process some items of evidence (R. 317: 115). At the
scene, she processed several items and took "six lift cards of fingerprints" (R. 317:
115). Stewart lifted six prints off the scale and one print off the glass weighing plate of
the scale (R. 317: 115-16). Stewart also processed several glassware items, a pyrex
container, and possibly a beaker (R. 317: 119). Another technician (Weaver) processed
additional items in the house (R. 317: 119).

Generally it is impossible to tell how

long a print has been on an item (R. 317: 121).

E. Testimony of Daniel James Weaver
Daniel Weaver is also a crime lab technician with the Salt Lake City Police
Department (R. 317: 123). Weaver was also present at the Sego Avenue residence to
take photographs of the inside of the house and to process some of that evidence for
fingerprints (R. 317: 123). Weaver took four lifts "that were of comparable value off
of a couple of glass beakers (the 1,000 milliliter beaker and a 125-milliliter beaker (R.
317: 124, 125).

F. Testimony of Karen Kido
Karen Kido, another Salt Lake City crime lab technician, examined the
fingerprints that were taken from the evidence at the scene (R. 317: 128). Kido
testified that the prints depicted on State's Exhibit #8 (lifted by Stewart), #9 (lifted by
Stewart), and #10 (lifted by Weaver) matched up to Shephard (R. 317: 131, 132, 133,
136-37). Kido analyzed ten latent lift cards total including two other fingerprints that
she matched up to Micalyn Yocham (one lifted by Stewart and one by Weaver) (R.
317: 135). Kido testified that none of the fingerprints matched up to Turner (R. 317:
137-38).

G. Testimony of Kyle Boelter
Kyle Boelter is an undercover narcotic detective with the Salt Lake City Police
Department (R. 317: 139). Boelter responded to the scene with Sturzenegger at the
request of patrol officers (R. 317: 139). Upon arrival at the scene he talked with the
patrol officers and then chatted with Turner and Shephard (R. 317: 139). Boelter also
initially looked at items found in the garage (R. 317: 139).
Boelter interviewed Shephard at the scene and informed him of his rights per
Miranda (R. 317: 140). Shephard stated that he had been at the residence earlier in the
day and that on occasion he stays at the residence (R. 317: 140). Shephard told Boelter
that the residence belonged to his girlfriend, Micalyn (R. 317: 141). Shephard

indicated that he had used methamphetamine once or twice when he was eighteen yearsold (R. 317: 141). Shephard told Boelter that he rode his bicycle there that day and he
brought a couple of bags to the residence (R. 317: 141, 163). Shephard gave consent
to search the bags and no illegal items or any materials used to manufacture
methamphetamine were found in the bags (R. 317: 141-42, 162). The bags contained
"a numerous amount of clothing" (R. 317: 165). Shepard informed Boelter that he
"knew nothing" about the contents in the garage or what was taking place (R. 317:
165).
Boelter testified that there are common characteristics among people who
regularly use methamphetamine (R. 318: 191). These include a low appetite, grayish
or pasty skin tone, a nervous or "jumpy" character, and accelerated speech (R. 318:
192). Many users also scratch their skin often, causing open sores on their face and
their arms (R. 318: 192). Boelter testified that officers can give people field sobriety
and laboratory tests to determine whether a person is using drugs such as
methamphetamine (R. 318: 193). Shephard was not subjected to any of these tests (R.
318: 193).
Boelter also assisted in the execution of the search warrant and participated in
the "processing of the lab, of the components that were located inside the garage" (R.
317: 142). Processing the lab means to take the components from where they are in the
garage-or the hot zon e-and to break each it em down, itemize it on a list, photograph
it, take necessary samples, and then place them off to the side so a waste hazard

company could remove the items (R. 317: 145). Boelter testified that a lab is set
up/processed with three different zones: A hot zone or where the actual lab is at for
contamination purposes; A warm zone or the area of processing; And a cold zone
wilich is where the command post or other officers are located (R. 317: 145-46).
Boelter testified that the garage was equipped with an "early warning device of
some sort" that contained a loud alarm (R. 317: 143). And that from the garage
doorway you could see "the vent tube that was running along the length of the rafters.
Right off the right-hand side there was a small, red bag with some tubing inside of it.
Right off, to the right side of the doorway is where you can see the bucket that was
containing the water. And then a couple other large, Rubbermaid boxes" (R. 317: 14344). None of the lab items Boelter described were found outside the garage (R. 317:
144).
Boelter testified that the lab appeared to be in the "distillation process"; and that
it was running when he found it (R. 317: 144). The lab was within 500 feet of the
garage and other residences (R. 317: 145). Items that were processed from the lab by
Boelter included: a volumetric cylinder with iodine crystals on the bottom (State's
Exhibit #15); three 16-ounce containers of Red Devil lye (State's Exhibit #16); five
different containers of lacquer thinner, paint thinner, and acetone (State's Exhibit #17);
numerous components of other scientific glassware (with staining on them) and funnels
(State's Exhibit #18); and a 1,000-milliliter reaction vessel (State's Exhibit #19) (R.
317: 149-52). Boelter testified that all of these items are commonly used in the

production of methamphetamine (R. 317: 149-52). In addition, Boelter found the
reaction vessel, a 4,000-milliliter flat-bottom flask, along with a separatory funnel
(State's Exhibits #20-22) "actually hooked up and in the actual process of
manufacturing meth at the time" (R. 317: 152-53). Boelter also found two condenser
columns (State's Exhibit # 23), one of which was hooked up to the other components
and an Ohaus scale, commonly used in drug trafficking (R. 317: 153-54, 167).
A backpack was also found in the garage (State's Exhibit #12) which contained
various items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine (R. 318: 18485). Among the items found were glassware, iodine, liquid methamphetamine,
hydrochloric acid, a digital scale, and other paraphernalia (R. 318: 185-87).
Samples from the lab were sent to the State Crime Lab for analysis (R. 317: 147;
State's Exhibit #4). After the lab was processed, the hazardous wastes were disposed
(R. 317: 157).
Boelter testified that they attempted to take fingerprints from the lab items, but
they were unsuccessful because of the cold, snowing weather (R. 317: 156).
Boelter testified that the entire cooking process takes between four and ten hours,
depending on "numerous factors" (R. 317: 158). During the initial four to six hours,
the cook does not need to be present (R. 317: 158). The cook also does not need to be
present during the final distillation process, which can take from two to four hours (R.
317: 158).

Boelter testified that he went inside the house and looked around and saw some
paraphernalia, however he did not complete a search of the house (R. 317: 159).

H. Testimony of Jeff Payne
Jeff Payne is a detective for the Salt Lake City Police department, specializing in
the investigation and clean up of methamphetamine labs (R. 317: 169). Payne testified
that pursuant to section 58-37d-6, intent to manufacture methamphetamine is inferred if
a person possesses "one of three precursor chemicals, which three are red phosphorous,
pseudoephedrine and iodine, in conjunction with one of five items, the hardware, which
the items are a reaction vessel, a separatory funnel, a glass condenser, a heat mantle,
some type of heat source, or analytical balance or scales" (R. 317: 170).
Payne explained that there are "two halves to the manufacturing of
methamphetamine" (R. 317: 171). The first part involves the "cooking/manufacturing
phase" where the precursor chemicals are mixed, turning pseudoephedrine into a
methamphetamine acid (R. 317: 171-72). A base, such as Red Devil Lye, is added
creating a methamphetamine base (R. 317: 172-73). The meth base is then placed in a
reaction vessel, using rubber tubing attached to a condenser column (R. 317: 174). The
water and methamphetamine is evaporated and distilled together, creating
methamphetamine (R. 317: 174). Payne testified that "in this case everything is present
... for the manufacturing process" of methamphetamine (R. 317: 171).

Payne also testified that this lab cannot be left along for very long while
methamphetamine is being manufactured (R. 317: 174). Payne testified that the whole
process took four hours, but "depending on each individual recipe, your time frames
will change" (R. 317: 175). Through each stage, a person has to be physically present
to mix the chemicals, adjust the pH, dry the product out, and distill it (R. 317: 175-77).

I. Testimony of Micalyn Yocham
Micalyn Yocham testified that at the time of trial she had known Shephard for 56 years; and that after a period of no contact, she became reacquainted with him
approximately 2 years earlier (R. 318: 194). Yocham testified that on December 3,
2001, she was residing at 636 East Sego Avenue (R. 318: 194). Shephard stayed with
Yocham "off and on" but a "majority of the time" during 2001 (R. 318: 194-95).
Yocham did not see Shephard at the house on December 3, 2001, however, she did see
him during the evening of December 2 for about 20 minutes (R. 318: 195-96).
Yocham left for work at 8:00 a.m. on December 3 and did not return home until
after 6:00 p.m. (R. 318: 196-97). Yocham discovered around midnight that the police
had been to her house by checking her work voice mail while at a friends house (R.
318: 197, 221).
Yocham testified that some items in her house were not the in the same order as
she left them (R. 318: 200, 203). Yocham thought her house was not as messy when
the police found it, and she also could not remember leaving a chair on the table or

having a power cord running from her home to her shed outside (R. 318: 203-04).
Yocham thought she left a digital scale (State's Exhibit #3) in a hall closet, not on the
kitchen table (R. 318: 198). Yocham admitted that her fingerprints would be on the
scale, but she did not remember leaving the baggies of methamphetamine with the scale
on the kitchen table (R. 318: 198-99). Yocham did not recognize the 1000 milliliter
beaker (State's Exhibit #6) found in her pantry (R. 318: 199). However, Yocham
admitted that the small beaker (Defense's Exhibit #2) was hers and that she used it for
"rocks" (R. 318: 200).
Yocham testified that the bicycle (State's Exhibit #12) belonged to Shephard (R.
318: 201). The red jacket in the garage "look[ed] like" one Shephard owned and
Yocham also thought that the backpack in the garage was Shephard's (R. 318: 202).
Yocham admitted to using methamphetamine the week prior to December 3, but
denied any knowledge regarding the operating clandestine lab in her own garage (R.
318: 203, 216). Yocham had not been in the garage for two or three months before the
police came, and admitted that she did not know when or how the jacket got there (R.
318: 214).
Yocham also admitted to using and being addicted to methamphetamine for a
year prior to December 3 (R. 318: 218-20). Yocham did not think that
methamphetamine was in her house on December 3, but admitted that she had
paraphernalia for smoking methamphetamine in her home (R. 318: 197, 203, 216).
Yocham also flatly denied that the methamphetamine found in her home on December 3

was hers (R. 318: 222). However, Yocham previously entered a plea agreement where
she admitted to knowingly possessing the methamphetamine found in her home on
December 3 (R. 318: 223-28).
Yocham denied using the digital scale for weighing drugs, and testified "I never
used it" for anything (R. 318: 215). She thought a friend left the scale at her home (R.
318: 215).
Yocham was originally charged with three first degree felonies, but entered a
plea to a third degree felony, possession of methamphetamine, and was sentenced to
two years probation and community service (R. 318: 202, 205, 233). The plea was
conditioned upon Yocham testifying against Shephard at trial (R. 318: 209-10).

J. Testimony of Todd Turner
Todd Turner has known Shephard for "over ten years" (R. 318: 246). Turner
went over to Yocham's house on December 2, 2001, because he had heard that
Shephard "was staying there with his girlfriend" (R. 318: 247). Turner saw Shephard
and Yocham "for a few minutes" that evening (R. 318: 247).
Turner again went to Yocham's the next day on the 3rd, supposedly to "get
high" with Shephard (R. 318: 247, 249). Around 6:30 p.m., Turner pulled into
Yocham's driveway and then knocked on the door (R. 318: 247). After no one
answered, Turner went to the garage door "and pushed it open" to see if there any tools

in there (R. 318: 248). Turner testified "I dropped my muffler off my truck ... like
right before that" and went in the garage to see if there were any tools (R. 318: 248).
Once Turner was in the garage, he heard a car pull up and heard someone yell
"in the garage" (R. 318: 248). Turner went outside and saw police surround the house
and then he was arrested (R. 318: 248-49).
Turner did not see Shephard that night, nor did he enter Yocham's house (R.
318: 250-51). Turner also did not know whether Shephard had a bicycle, but he knew
that Yocham had a car (R. 318: 251).
Turner claimed that the backpack in the garage was not his, but he admitted to
having methamphetamine in his pocket (R. 318: 252-53). Turner also admitted to using
drugs earlier that day with intent to get more at Yocham's house (R. 318: 256).
Turner was originally charged with a first degree felony for operating a
clandestine laboratory, but based on his agreement to testify against Shephard, his
charge was reduced to a third degree felony for possession of methamphetamine (R.
318: 255-56).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Dean
Shephard intentionally engaged in operating a clandestine laboratory. The State failed
to show sufficient evidence that Shephard possessed a controlled substance precursor or

laboratory equipment with the requisite intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation. Thus, the State failed to prove a sufficient nexus between Shephard and the
clandestine laboratory.
Additionally, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that Shephard possessed a
controlled substance precursor or laboratory equipment with intent to engage in a
clandestine laboratory and the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the
trial court committed plain error in submitting this charge to the jury.
But for this error, Shephard would have received a more favorable outcome at
trial. Accordingly, Shephard asks this Court to reverse his conviction for operating a
clandestine laboratory.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
SHEPHARD'S CONVICTION FOR OPERATION OF A
CLANDESTINE LABORATORY BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED
TO ESTABLISH A SUFFICIENT NEXUS BETWEEN SHEPHARD
AND THE CLANDESTINE LABORATORY

Shephard asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knowingly
and intentionally operated a clandestine laboratory in violation of Utah Code Annotated
§ 58-37d-5, because the State failed to prove a sufficient nexus between Shephard and
the clandestine laboratory. Shephard also asserts that it was plain error for the trial
court to submit this case to the jury, or in the alternative, his trial counsel's
performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move for a
directed verdict regarding the clandestine laboratory charge. Accordingly, Shephard
asks this Court to reverse his conviction for operating a clandestine laboratory.
An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can
demonstrate that... 'p lain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10
P.3d 346 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v.
Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)).
To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a defendant
must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime
charged...." Holgate, 2000 UT 71 at fl7. 'To demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,
114, 989 P.2d 1065 (qioting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah
1991)). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's

verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^[18 (quoting
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Then the defendant must show "that
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting
the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 117.
A.

The Evidence Failed To Establish a Sufficient Nexus Between Shephard and
the Clandestine Laboratory
In order to prove that Shephard intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory

operation, the State must prove that he possessed a controlled substance precursor or
laboratory equipment with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation or
conspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. See
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37d-4(l). In order to prove constructive possession, there
must be a nexus between the accused and the controlled substance precursor or
laboratory equipment sufficient enough to permit an inference that the accused had both
the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the materials with intent
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. See State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386,
1388 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted); State v. Reed, 2000 UT App 128
(memorandum decision); State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, \h, 985 P2d 911; State v.
Fox, 709 P.2d, 316, 319 (Utah 1985).

In State v. Reed, 2000 UT App 258 (memorandum decision), the defendant was
convicted of operating a clandestine laboratory. Id. at 1. Apparently, the defendant
lived in the house for three weeks before controlled substance precursors and laboratory
equipment were found. Id. However, "the room containing the laboratory equipment
was rented to someone other than the defendant." Id. Also, no controlled substance
precursors or laboratory equipment were found among the defendant's personal effect
and the defendant made no incriminating statements connecting him to the laboratory
found in the house. Id.
This Court held in Reed that in order to convict a person for operating a
clandestine laboratory, the State must establish that the defendant intended to "engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation [and] actually possessed the controlled substance
precursor, or laboratory equipment, or supplies." Id. And in order to prove
constructive possession, "it is necessary that 'there [be] a sufficient nexus between the
accused and the dmg [or paraphernalia] to permit an inference that the accused had both
the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug [or
paraphernalia]." Id. (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79 at ^3).
This Court found that the fact that the defendant lived in the home for three
weeks where the laboratory was found was "not enough to establish constructive
possession." Id. Additionally, there was no evidence indicating that defendant had any
control over the room or its contents where the laboratory equipment was located. Id.
Moreover, the defendant made no incriminating statements and did not have any

clandestine laboratory items on his person. Id. This Court concluded that this
"evidence does not 'permit an inference that [defendant] had both the power and the
intent to exercise dominion and control' over the contraband found in the downstairs
bedroom." Id. (quoting Layman, 1999 UT 79 at 113).
In State v. Solas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991), police received a tip
from an informant that the defendant would be in possession of cocaine during his lunch
hour. Id. at 1386. The police ran a check through the State computer to determine
whether the defendant had a valid driver's license. Id. No valid driver's license was
found, even though the defendant had one. Id. At noon, the officers observed the
defendant leave his place of employment with two other men and enter a vehicle
matching the description given by the informant. Id. at 1387. The police stopped the
defendant for driving without a license and told the defendant that they received a tip
that the defendant would be in possession of cocaine. Id. The defendant told the
officers that he did not "have anything to worry about," and consented to a search of
his vehicle. Id. During a search of the vehicle, the officers discovered a package
containing cocaine in the crack of the backseat on the driver's side of the vehicle. Id.
When the officers discovered the cocaine, the defendant testified "they put it there." Id.
This Court held that "[a] sufficient nexus is not established by mere ownership
and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs were found ... especially when
occupancy is not exclusive." Id. at 1389. (citation omitted). Additionally, this Court
stated:

In order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs found in an
automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to,
there must be other evidence to buttress such an inference. The law has
recognized several particular evidentiary factors linking or tending to link an
accused with drugs. These include incriminating statements, suspicious or
incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of defendant to
location of drugs, drugs in plain view, and drugs on defendant's person.
Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389.
This Court, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
held that the factual evidence was inconclusive as to whether the defendant knew of or
possessed the cocaine. Id. The Court observed that the defendant's wife was the coowner of the vehicle and there were two passengers in the vehicle at the time of arrest.
Id. Further, the passengers had better access to the spot where the cocaine was found.
Id. The Court also stated that the "defendant denied the presence of cocaine before the
search, did not try to escape during the search ... and did not have drugs or
paraphernalia on his person at the time of arrest." Id. Moreover, one of the backseat
passengers sitting behind the defendant "moved around just before the stop." Id. at
1388. The Court concluded "[tjhis furtive movement, coupled with the fact that the
cocaine was found under the backseat where a passenger had been sitting, renders the
remaining evidence sufficiently inconclusive as to whether defendant knew of the

presence of the cocaine or had the intent to exercise dominion and control over the
cocaine." Id.
In State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985), police received an anonymous
letter stating that 7-foot marijuana plants were growing at the defendant's residence.
Fox, 709 P.2d at 318. The residence belonged to Gary Fox. Id. After investigating the
tip, the police determined that the yard contained "two opaque greenhouses, one of
which was attached to the house," containing marijuana. Id. The investigating officer
obtained a search warrant and conducted a search while the premises were unoccupied.
Id.
The home had two bedrooms, one apparently occupied by Clive Fox and the
other by Gary Fox. Id. Clive's bedroom contained men's clothing, carpentry tools, and
a plastic identification card. Id. Gary's bedroom contained men's clothing, women's
underclothing, a checkbook and bank deposit slips with Gary's name on them, a book
entitled Marijuana Grower's Guide, marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Id. Both
greenhouses contained marijuana plants and one greenhouse was accessible from the
kitchen and had no outside entrance. Id. Moreover, the entire house was "very humid"
and mail addressed to both Gary and Clive was found in the house. Id.
Although Gary owned the property and paid the gas bills, the telephone listing
was in Clive's name. Id. And while the police did not see neither Gary nor Clive at the
house, a neighbor testified that he thought both men lived at the house since he saw
them both doing yard work. Id.

Both Gary and Clive were charged and convicted of production of a controlled
substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed Gary's conviction, finding a "sufficient nexus
between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the
power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." Fox, 709 P.2d at
319. The Court observed that Gary owned the property where the marijuana was
found, and "[h]is occupancy and control was evidenced by the presence of his personal
effects in the same room as marijuana [and] drug-related paraphernalia." Id. at 320.
The Court reasoned that because Gary "was the owner and occupier of the property and
because of the manner in which the greenhouses were constructed in proximity to the
house ... there is a reasonable inference that he not only knew of the greenhouses and
their contents but also had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over
the marijuana located in them." Id.
However, the Court reversed Clive's conviction. Although the Court found that
the evidence showed that Clive "knew that marijuana was being grown in the house ....
The evidence [did not show] that he had power and intent to exercise dominion or
control over the marijuana." 709 P.2d at 320. The Court observed that there was "no
evidence that Clive Fox had any intent to grow or possess the marijuana," even though
he "may have had knowledge of the existence of marijuana on the premises." Id. The
Court concluded:

The evidence showed that the telephone ... w as in Give's name, that he was
seen there on an undated occasion doing yard work, that mail addressed to him
was found at unspecified locations within the house, and that his expired
identification card was found in the room that apparently was his sleeping
quarters which contained no marijuana or related paraphernalia. On the totality
of the evidence, a reasonable person could not find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Clive had even non-exclusive dominion or control over the area where the
marijuana was found."
Id.
In Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 501, the Spanish
Fork Police Department received information that drugs were being used at the
defendant's and her husband's residence. Id. at \2. Police officers searched the
residence's garbage can and found residue containing methamphetamine, cocaine, and
marijuana. Id. That same day, the officers obtained a search warrant and searched the
home finding "a roach clip, scissors, clippers, zig-zags (papers used to roll cigarettes),
and 'antique' prescription pill bottles dated from 1968 to 1978." Id. Officers also
found "hypodermic needles, hermostats, and a photograph of six men, including
defendant's husband, in which two of the men were smoking a bong. The hypodermic
needles were found beneath the mattress of the bed defendant shared with her
husband." Id. All other items were found in plain view of the investigating officers.

Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted for possession of drug paraphernalia. Id.
at 11.
This Court in Bryan observed that the defendant was not present when the items
were found; there was no evidence that the defendant used or intended to use the items
for illegal purposes; there "was no evidence that [the defendant] participated in the
mutual use of the items seized"; and the defendant made no incriminating statements.
Id. at 19. This Court stated, "Here, the necessary nexus between defendant and the
items seized does not exist." Id. at if 10. This Court further stated that the conviction
was based entirely upon inferences, and thus "the factual evidence in this case is
inconclusive as to whether she possessed the items found in her home." Id. at f 11.
This Court concluded that this "circumstantial evidence" was insufficient to prove
constructive possession. Id. at \\s

10-11.

Following the facts and conclusions of law set forth in Reed, Salas, Fox, and
Bryan, Shephard asserts that the evidence supporting the jury's verdict in this case was
insufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and
intentionally possessed a controlled substance precursor or laboratory equipment
sufficient enough to establish that he had both the power and intent to exercise
dominion and control over the materials with intent to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation, thereby violating Utah Code Annotated §§ 58-37d-4(l) and 5837d-5(l).

A review of all the evidence allegedly linking Shephard to this charge is
necessary to support this assertion. The police responded to a possible burglary attempt
at Yocham's residence, and when they arrived at the scene, they saw Turner leaving the
garage (R. 318: 248-49). Turner admitted to using methamphetamine that day and also
was also found to have methamphetamine in his pocket when he was subsequently
arrested, but denied any involvement with the lab discovered in the garage (R. 318:
252, 256).
The police then decided to conduct a "protective sweep" of the home, even
though it was detached from the garage (R. 317: 66-67). The police knocked on the
door several times before Shephard answered (R. 317: 67). Shephard told the police
that he had been sleeping and that he was not the owner of the residence (R. 317: 141).
He also told the police that he rode his bicycle there that day and he brought a couple of
bags to the residence (R. 317: 141, 163). Shephard allowed the police to search his
bags and no illegal items or any materials used to manufacture methamphetamine were
found in the bags (R. 317: 141-42, 162). He also told the police that he "knew
nothing" about the contents in the garage or what was taking place (R. 317: 165).
Shephard admitted to using methamphetamine once or twice in his use, but denied using
drugs currently, and apparently the police believed him (R. 317: 141, 191-93).
The police tested the illegal items discovered in the garage for fingerprints, but
Shephard was not linked to any of them (R. 317: 156). Shephard's fingerprints were

found on two items inside the house, a digital scale and a beaker (R. 317: 131-33, 13637).
Both Yocham and Turner testified that they were not involved with the
clandestine laboratory, even though Yocham was the owner of the residence and Turner
was caught leaving the garage and both admitted to being heavily involved in
methamphetamine use (R. 318: 214, 218-19, 248-49, 252). Neither Yocham nor
Turner claimed that Shephard was responsible for the drug lab either. Yocham did say
that a coat found in the garage "look[ed] like" one Shephard owned and she also
thought that a backpack found in the garage was Shephard's, however she could not be
for sure because she had not been in the garage for two or three months (R. 318: 202,
214). Thus, the only evidence linking Shephard to the clandestine laboratory found in
the garage was the fact that Shephard was at Yocham's house sleeping when the police
arrived and one fingerprint was found on a glass beaker and two prints on a digital
scale inside the home (R. 317: 131, 132, 133, 136-37).
Accordingly, the facts in this case are similar to Reed, Salas, Fox, and Bryan.
This Court in Salas concluded that "when occupancy is not exclusive," a "sufficient
nexus is not established by mere ownership and/or occupancy" without more. Id. at
1389. There was also no evidence that Shephard had access to the garage since there
was a functional alarm system attached to the garage (R. 317: 143). In fact, the
evidence showed that Turner had access to the garage since he was able to enter the
garage without setting the alarm system off, and Yocham likely had access to the

garage since she was the owner (R. 318: 248). Shephard did have access to Yocham's
house, since he was staying there off and on throughout 2001 and he was there on
December 3 (R. 318: 194-95). But the fact that Shephard had access to Yocham's
home does not establish a sufficient nexus without more.
Like the defendants in Reed, Salas, and Bryan, Shephard did not have any drugs
or other illegal items in his possession when he was searched (R. 317: 141-42, 162).
And although Shephard's prints were found on a beaker and a digital scale inside
Yocham's home, this is also not dispositive of the issue. In Bryan, police found drug
paraphernalia throughout the defendant's house, where both she and her husband lived;
however the defendant's conviction was reversed. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, at f2. This
Court held that this "circumstantial evidence" was insufficient to prove constructive
possession where the defendant made no incriminating statements and there was no
evidence that the defendant intended to use the items for illegal purposes. Id. at *[9.
And in Fox, where the defendant knew that marijuana was being grown to be
distributed, there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant "had power and intent to exercise dominion or control over the marijuana."
Fox, 709 P.2d at 320.
Shephard also made no incriminating statements, and there was no evidence that
he intended to engage in operating a clandestine laboratory. Just because his prints
were found on a beaker and a digital scale inside the house, there was no evidence

indicating when the prints were placed on those items and there was no evidence that
those items were used in operating the meth lab.
There was also insufficient evidence linking Shephard to the garage. Yocham
testified only that she thought the coat found in the garage looked like Shephard's and
she also thought that the backpack was his (R. 318: 202). Thus, Yocham could not be
certain that the items in the garage were in fact Shephard's. Also, Yocham's testimony
was inherently unreliable since she first testified that she was not aware that
methamphetamine was at her residence on December 3, 2001, but was later forced to
admit that the methamphetamine discovered that day was in fact hers (R. 318: 222,
223-28). Moreover, Yocham received an incredibly light sentence for promising to
testify against Shephard, even though there was substantial evidence that she was aware
of and supported the operational clandestine laboratory in her garage (R. 318: 209-10).
Accordingly, Shephard asserts that this evidence was insufficient to prove
constructive possession because it does not create a sufficient nexus showing that he
intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. There was absolutely no
evidence that he conspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation and there was insufficient evidence to show that he possessed a controlled
substance precursor or laboratory equipment with the intent to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation.

B.

The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Submitting this Charge to the
Jury.
Shephard asserts that this evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently

improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that he
intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. Although this issue was not
preserved below, Shephard asserts that the insufficiency was so obvious and
fundamental that the trial court committed plain error in submitting this case to the jury.
The purpose of review under a plain error standard is to "avoid injustice."
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 113 (quoting State v. Eldridge, 713 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah
App. 1989).
As shown above in point A, the State failed to prove that Shephard had both
power and intent to exercise dominion and control over a controlled substance
precursor or laboratory equipment with the requisite intent to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation. The evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it
was plain error to submit this case to the jury. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 117. But for
this error, Shephard would not have been convicted of this charge.

C.

Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict When the Evidence
Was Insufficient Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Shephard's trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness for failing to move for a directed verdict. Moreover, this
deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial.

The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); See also
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114
S.Ct. 706, 126 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on
failure to move to dismiss where the evidence to convict was sufficient)).
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v.
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 1|25, 1 P.3d 546; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
As stated above, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to submit this
case to the jury. Accordingly, trial counsel's performance was deficient for failing to
move for a directed verdict under the reasoning set forth in Reyes. But for this failure,
this charge would not have been submitted to the jury and Shephard would not have
been convicted of operating a clandestine laboratory.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Shephard asks this Court to reverse his conviction for
operating a clandestine laboratory. In the alternative, Shephard asks this Court to
remand this matter to the District Court for further proceedings.
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58-37d-4

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

of these activities, when the substance is to be used
for the illegal manufacture of specified controlled
substances,
(v) illegal manufacture of specified controlled sub
stances, or
(vi) distribution or disposal of chemicals, equipment, supplies, or products used m or produced by
the illegal manufacture of specified controlled substances
(c) 'Controlled substance precursor" means those
chemicals designated in Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled
Substance Precursor Act, except those substances designated m Subsections 58 37c 3(2)(kk) and (11)
(d) 'Disposal" means the abandonment, discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of
any hazardous or dangerous material into or on any
propei ty, land or water so t h a t the material may enter the
environment, be emitted into the air, or discharged into
any waters, including groundwater
(e) 'Hazardous or dangerous material" means any substance which because of its quantity, concentration, physical characteristics, or chemical characteristics may cause
or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality, an
increase in serious illness, or may pose a substantial
present or potential future hazard to h u m a n health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise improperly managed
(f) "Illegal manufacture of specified controlled substances" means in violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah
Controlled Substances Act, the
(I) compounding, synthesis, concentration, purification, separation, extraction, or other physical or
chemical processing for the purpose of producing
methamphetamme, other amphetamine compounds
as listed in Schedule I of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, phencychdine, narcotic analgesic analogs
as listed in Schedule I of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, lysergic acid diethylamide, or mescaline,
(n) conversion of cocaine or methamphetamme to
their base forms, or
(m) extraction, concentration, or synthesis of marrjuana as that drug is defined in Section 58-37-2
(2) Unless otherwise specified, the definitions in Section
58-37-2 also apply to this chapter
2003
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — S e c o n d d e g r e e felony.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation,
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation,
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor
chemical, laboratory equipment, or laboratory supplies
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe it will be
used for a clandestine laboratory operation,
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter
37c, Controlled Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe that the material distributed or received
will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation,
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation,
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to
produce or manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized under Title 58, Chapter 37,
U t a h Controlled Substances Act,
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit sub. „
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counterfeit substance or by any other person regardless of f
whether the final destination for the distribution is within
this state or any other location, or
(h) engage m compounding, synthesis, concentration,
purification, separation, extraction, or other physical or
chemical processing of any substance, including a con
trolled substance precursor, or the packaging, repackag
ing, labeling, or relabeling of a container holding a sub
stance that is a product of any of these activities, knowing
or having reasonable cause to believe t h a t the substance
that is a product of any of these activities and will be used
m the illegal manufacture of specified controlled sub
stances
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is
guilty of a second degree felony
2003
58-37d-5. P r o h i b i t e d acts — First d e g r e e felony.
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e),
(f), or (h) is guilty of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also
finds any one of the following conditions occurred in conjunc
tion with that violation
(a) possession of a firearm,
(b) use of a booby trap,
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of
hazardous or dangerous material or while transporting or
causing to be transported materials in furtherance of a
clandestine laboratory operation, there was created a
substantial risk to h u m a n health or safety or a danger to
the environment,
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or
did take place within 500 feet of a residence, place of
business, church, or school,
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced
any amount of a specified controlled substance, or
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for
the production of cocaine base or methamphetamme base
(2) If the trier of fact finds t h a t two or more of the conditions
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (f) of this section occurred
in conjunction with the violation, at sentencing for the first
degree felony
(a) probation shall not be granted,
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be
suspended, and
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower
category of offense
2003
58-37d-6.

Legal i n f e r e n c e of i n t e n t — Illegal possess i o n of a controlled s u b s t a n c e precursor ot
c l a n d e s t i n e laboratory e q u i p m e n t .
The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to
engage m a clandestine laboratory operation if the defendant
(1) is m illegal possession of a controlled substance
precursor, or
(2) illegally possesses or attempts to illegally possess a
controlled substance precursor and is in possession of aflj
one of the following pieces of equipment
(a) glass reaction vessel,
(b) separatory funnel,
(c) glass condenser,
(d) analytical balance, or
l9
(e) heating mantle
58-37d-7. S e i z u r e a n d forfeiture.
Chemicals, equipment, supplies, vehicles, aircraft, vess<ids.
and personal and real property used in furtherance of?
- ,
clandestine laboratory operation are subject to seizure &
forfeiture under the procedures and substantive protections
m . i . i _ OA
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